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Abstract: This paper examines the use of market-share thresholds (safe har-
bors) in evaluating whether a given vertical practice should be challenged. Such
thresholds are typically found in vertical restraints guidelines (e.g., the 2000 Guide-
lines for the European Commission and the 1985 Guidelines for the U.S. Department
of Justice). We consider a model of resale price maintenance (RPM) in which firms
employ RPM to dampen downstream price competition. In this model, we find
that restrictions on the use of RPM by a dominant firm can be welfare improving,
but restrictions on the extent of the market that can be covered by RPM (i.e., the
pervasiveness of the practice among firms in the industry) may lead to lower welfare
and higher consumer prices than under a laissez-faire policy. Our results thus call
into question the indiscriminate use of market-share thresholds in vertical cases.
...the court has steadily backed away from a categorical view of antitrust liability
and is highly likely to ... [do] ... the same for resale price maintenance.
New York Times (7 December, 2006) on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to
examine the nearly one-hundred year old per se ban on RPM.
1 Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to revisit the nearly one-hundred year old
per se ban on resale price maintenance (a practice in which control over retail prices
is given to the manufacturer). Unlike many other vertical restraints, resale price
maintenance (RPM) is considered per se illegal in the United States (and in many
other countries), but the definition of what constitutes RPM has been narrowing
and no longer encompasses the use of vertical price ceilings.1 Vertical price floors,
and cases in which manufacturers fix retail prices, however, continue to be banned,
and the question before the Court is whether a small firm’s use of such restraints,
and the likely economic eﬀects of these restraints, warrants such harsh treatment.
The majority of non-price vertical restraints are judged under a rule-of-reason
standard,2 and many, perhaps most, economists believe that RPM should be treated
similarly. In addition to concerns about the use of RPM to facilitate cartels and
dampen competition, it is well-known that RPM can also have eﬃciency benefits
(see, for example, Telser, 1960; Marvel and McCaﬀerty, 1984; Mathewson and Win-
ter, 1984; Winter, 1993; and Perry and Besanko, 1991). For a broad overview of the
two sides, see Overstreet (1983).
A full-blown rule-of-reason approach would seek to assess and compare the eﬃ-
ciency and anticompetitive considerations (both in magnitude and in likelihood) on
a case-by-case basis. This is potentially very costly in terms of time and resources,
however, and so in practice, in evaluating whether or not a particular vertical re-
1See, for example, Dr. Miles v. Park & Sons, 1911, and the subsequent narrowing of the scope
of RPM in Monsanto v. Spray Rite, 1984, Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, 1988, and
State Oil v. Khan, 1997. In the latter case, the Court lifted the per se ban on price ceilings.
2See, for example, the Court’s decision in Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 1977.
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straint should be challenged, the courts and the competition authorities typically
use a more structured rule-of-reason approach in which individual firm and industry
‘safe harbors’ are established. If adoption of the practice by a firm is found to fall
within these safe harbors, the practice at hand is not challenged, whereas if adoption
is found to fall outside these safe harbors, the practice receives greater scrutiny.
One such safe harbor typically concerns the market share of the firm that is
adopting a given practice, and another typically looks at the pervasiveness of the
practice in the relevant market. See, for example, the vertical-restraints guidelines
that influenced the U.S. Department of Justice’s thinking for many years.3 Accord-
ing to these guidelines, the practice would not be challenged if, among other things,
industry-wide adoption of the practice accounted for less than 60% of the relevant
market and the firm employing the restraint had a market share of 10% or less.4
The guidelines used today in Europe have a similar flavor. In particular, the
European Commission’s vertical-restraints guidelines oﬀer a block exemption for
vertical restraints used by firms with a market-share below 30%, but, at the same
time, it states (para 80) that “Article 8 of the Block Exemption Regulation enables
the Commission to exclude from the scope of the Block Exemption Regulation, by
means of regulation, parallel networks of similar vertical restraints where these cover
more than 50% of the relevant market." Beyond these safe harbors, a rule-of-reason
approach is applied to determine whether a given restraint should be challenged.
The main approach used within both the EU and (at least tacitly) in the United
States is thus that vertical restraints only raise concerns when they are adopted by
firms that enjoy suﬃcient market power or where the practice is pervasive in the
relevant market. Not surprisingly, therefore, in the instant case where the Supreme
3The DOJ’s vertical-restraints guidelines were issued in 1985 in order to reduce the business
uncertainty associated with antitrust enforcement in this area. However, they immediately met
opposition from Congress, which felt that they were a thinly veiled attempt to treat price and non-
price restraints alike, and were rescinded in 1993 because of the administration’s perception that
they were to quick to “... discount the anti-competitive potential of vertical intrabrand restraints
and so easily to assume their eﬃciency-enhancing potential as to predetermine the conclusion
against enforcement action in almost every case (www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/0867.htm).”
4Taken from the DOJ’s 1985 vertical-restraints guidelines, section 4.1.
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Court examines the per se ban on RPM, it is alleged that the manufacturer is small,
has no market power, and operates in an environment in which RPM is not pervasive
and in which the market is competitive. Furthermore, it is alleged that conditions
are such that the manufacturer is well within traditionally recognized safe harbors.
In this paper, we examine the use of safe harbors (and in particular the market-
share thresholds that are behind them) when evaluating whether or not a given
vertical practice should be challenged. We do so in a model in which firms uni-
laterally choose whether to employ RPM as a possible strategy to dampen price
competition, a la Shaﬀer (1991). We solve for the equilibrium outcome of the model
with respect to welfare and consumer prices in the absence of any restrictions on the
use of RPM and compare it to the equilibrium outcome that would arise in a world in
which the courts and the competition authorities impose safe harbors. We consider
two types of safe harbors. The first concerns restrictions on the adoption of RPM
by dominant firms. The second concerns restrictions on industry-wide adoption.
We find that restrictions on the use of RPM by a dominant firm can be welfare
improving. With such restrictions, policy makers can choose among multiple equi-
libria to induce more favorable outcomes (lower prices for consumers). Surprisingly,
however, even though there are no eﬃciency gains from the use of RPM, restrictions
on the extent to which RPM may be adopted industry-wide may lead to lower wel-
fare and higher consumer prices than a laissez-faire policy. Using the thresholds on
industry-wide adoption established in both the U.S. and EC’s guidelines, for exam-
ple, we find that welfare would be unambiguously lower under the guidelines. Our
results thus call into question the indiscriminate use of such share-based thresholds.
In the model, RPM allows each retailer-manufacturer pair to be a Stackelberg
leader relative to all retailer-manufacturer pairs that do not adopt RPM. This results
in an equilibrium in which all or all but one of the firms will agree to an RPM
contract, as each attempts to be a leader. With restrictions on the use of RPM
by a dominant firm, policy makers are able to ensure that the dominant firm is
a follower — not a leader — and this results in lower prices to consumers. On the
other hand, restrictions on the number of firms that are allowed to adopt RPM do
not fare as well. With approximately half the firms as leaders, and the other half
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as followers, price increases to consumers are magnified, resulting in overall higher
prices to consumers than there would have been in the absence of any constraints.
The model focuses on anticompetitive motives for adopting RPM, but allowing
for eﬃciencies only strengthens our qualitative conclusions. If firms are adopting
RPM for eﬃciency reasons, then any restrictions on the usage of RPM may lower
welfare. Hence, whether RPM is used for eﬃciency reasons, or for the anticompeti-
tive reasons we model, strict enforcement of safe harbor provisions on industry-wide
adoption of RPM may result in lower welfare and higher prices to consumers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and
solve for the equilibrium outcomes without restrictions on the adoption of RPM. In
Section 3, we analyze the welfare and price eﬀects of limiting industry-wide adoption
of RPM. In Section 4, we examine the welfare and price eﬀects of prohibiting the
adoption of RPM by dominant firms. In Section 5, we oﬀer concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a market structure in which n ≥ 2 diﬀerentiated retailers buy a ho-
mogenous input from a manufacturing sector that is perfectly competitive. The
upstream firms’ marginal costs are equal to c ≥ 0, and one unit of input is needed
to produce one unit of output. For simplicity, we set the retailers’ marginal costs to
zero. We assume consumers have heterogeneous preferences over where to shop.
The game has the following structure: wholesale contracts are determined in
stage 1 and retail prices are chosen in stage 2. We assume that in stage 1 a large
number of identical manufacturers non-cooperatively oﬀer to sell their inputs under
one of two types of contracts: a contract that specifies a unit wholesale price only,
or a contract that specifies a unit wholesale price and an end-user price (RPM). In
stage 2 retailers who have not entered into an RPM contract compete in setting
prices, while the remaining retailers choose the RPM prices determined in stage 1.5
5At this point, it is helpful to think of the RPM prices as fixed. In equilibrium, it will become
apparent that price floors work equally well. We abstract for simplicity from contract enforcement
issues (i.e, if a retailer ignores the RPM price specified in its first-stage contract, it is subject to a
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This set-up is similar to that in Shaﬀer (1991), except that here we consider
a retail oligopoly instead of a retail duopoly (i.e., we allow for n > 2). As in his
model, the key insight that drives the results is that retailers who choose an RPM
contract in stage one become price leaders (l), while the remaining retailers become
price followers (f).6 We assume players have perfect knowledge of how their actions
aﬀect actions in all succeeding stages, and all information is common knowledge.
Let retailers 1 through m be the leaders and retailers m + 1 through n be the
followers. In any equilibrium with m leaders, neither the leaders nor the followers
have incentives to deviate. We use subgame perfection as our solution concept.
The demand curve faced by downstream firm i = 1, ..., n is given byDi(p), where
p is the vector of prices charged by the n downstream firms. The demand function
Di(p) is assumed to satisfy the usual properties in partial equilibrium analysis:
Dii < 0, D
i
j > 0, D
i
ij ≥ 0 D
j
i < −Dii i, j = 1, ...n., i 6= j (1)
Superscripts above the demand functions indicate the retailer, while subscripts indi-
cate partial derivatives with respect to retail prices. Condition (1) implies that the
products are imperfect substitutes and that the marginal demand eﬀect of a price
change by firm i is (weakly) increasing in the price of firm j. Thus, condition (1)
ensures that prices are strategic complements, as defined in Bulow et al (1985).
The profit level of retailer i is
πi = (pi − wi)Di(p), (2)
where pi is retailer i’s retail price, and wi is the unit wholesale price of the manu-
facturer serving retailer i. The profit level of the corresponding manufacturer is
πMi = (wi − c)Di(p). (3)
prohibitively large penalty payable to the manufacturer). We also implicitly assume that contracts
signed in stage one cannot be renegotiated in stage two, after rivals’ contract choices are observed.
6This idea is based on the strategic delegation literature, where the seminal paper is Fershtman
and Judd (1987). Shaﬀer (1991) compares slotting allowances and RPM and shows that both may
be used to dampen competition if it is the retailers - not the suppliers - who have the bargaining
power. Gal-Or (1991), Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1995) build on the
same framework, but they assume that the bargaining power is in the hands of the suppliers. See
also Jansen (2003), Corts and Neher (2003), Moner-Colonques et al. (2004), and Innes (2006).
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In solving the game, it is useful to make two preliminary observations. First,
competition among the manufacturers to gain retail access implies that the man-
ufacturers’ participation constraints will be binding (πMi = 0) for both types of
contracts (see Shaﬀer, 1991). Thus, it follows that wi = ci in any equilibrium.7
Second, competition among the manufacturers also implies that, in any equilibrium
in which retailer i has an RPM contract, retailer i’s price maximizes its profit given
the other leaders’ prices and knowing the eﬀects of the leaders’ prices on the prices
to be set by the followers. Thus, in any equilibrium, retailer i’s RPM price solves
argmax
pi
(pi − wi)Di(pl1, ..., pi...., plm, p
f
m+1, ..., p
f
n),
where the superscript l denotes a leader’s price and f denotes a follower’s price.
Regarding the choice of contracts, we prove the following result in the Appendix:
Proposition 1: There are n subgame-perfect equilibria with m∗ = n−1 leaders,
and one subgame-perfect equilibrium with m∗ = n leaders.
To see the intuition for Proposition 1, and why there are no other subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria, suppose that the number of leaders is equal to
• zero (m = 0). In this case we have a pure Bertrand game. If one firm deviates
and chooses an RPM contract (m = 1), she will de facto become a Stackelberg leader.
It is well known that the profit level of a Stackelberg leader is higher than the profit
level of a firm in a simultaneous Bertrand game with diﬀerentiated products. The
reason for this is that she as a Stackelberg leader can pick the profit-maximizing
retail price given the rivals’ reaction functions (while she has no reaction functions
to utilize in a pure Bertrand game). Therefore m = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
• m < n − 1 (so that there are n − m followers). The prices of the m firms
that have signed an RPM contract are essentially exogenous at stage two. Given
the RPM prices of these m firms, would one of the followers have an incentive to
deviate and sign an RPM contract instead? The answer is yes, for the same reason as
7If negative fixed fees (i.e., slotting allowances) are feasible, then, as in Shaﬀer (1991), we would
have wi > c in some equilibria. However, if wholesale prices are unobservable, so that they cannot
be used to dampen competition, then wi = c in all equilibria whether or not fixed fees are feasible.
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above: as a Stackelberg leader she can pick the optimal retail price on the n−m−1
followers’ reaction functions.8 Consequently, m < n− 1 cannot be an equilibrium.
• m = n − 1. In this case there is only one price follower, while the rest of
the retailers are price leaders. The follower will therefore have nothing to gain by
becoming a leader herself, since there does not exist any other follower (and thus
no reaction function to exploit). Also, none of the leaders have anything to gain
by becoming a follower because each would then lose the opportunity to aﬀect the
other follower’s reaction function. Thus, m = n− 1 is an equilibrium.
• m = n. No retailer can gain by becoming a follower when all the other firms
are leaders with predetermined prices. It follows that m = n is an equilibrium.
We thus have multiple equilibria: there are n subgame-perfect equilibria with
n− 1 leaders (where the equilibria are distinguished by which firm is the follower),
and one subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all firms are (or try to be) leaders.
Note that the case of m = n means that all firms have committed in stage 1 to an
RPM contract that eﬀectively fixes their retail prices in stage 2. When this happens,
all firms are de facto choosing prices simultaneously (albeit in stage one instead of
in stage two), and hence, the equilibrium in which all firms are leaders (m∗ = n)
leads to the same prices and profits that would arise in an n-firm Bertrand pricing
game in which all firms are followers (m = 0). This observation will prove useful
in what follows because although the case of m = 0 does not arise in a free-market
equilibrium, it would arise, for example, if there were a general ban towards RPM.
Note also that prices and profits are higher in a Stackelberg game with leaders
and followers than in a Bertrand game in which n firms simultaneously choose prices,
and that this holds for all n equilibria with n − 1 leaders. Thus, we have that all
retailers (the leaders as well as the follower) will have higher prices and profits in
all equilibria with m∗ = n− 1 leaders compared to the equilibrium where m∗ = n.
As a consequence, the deadweight loss will be lower when m∗ = n.
Let welfare (W ) be the sum of consumer surplus and profits. Let Wm=0 denote
welfare in the subgame in which no firm has RPM, Wm=n denote welfare in the
8By the same logic, none of the price leaders would prefer to become a price follower.
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subgame in which all n firms have RPM, andWm=j denote welfare in the remaining
subgames in which j firms have RPM, j ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}. Then, our results imply:
Proposition 2: Welfare is highest in the equilibrium in which m∗ = n. More
generally, we have Wm=0 =Wm=n > Wm=j, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}.
The negative welfare eﬀect from reaching an equilibrium where m∗ = n − 1
rather than m∗ = n is significant if the number of the firms in the industry is low
(the equilibrium m∗ = n − 1 results in a welfare minimum if n = 2, as shown by
Shaﬀer, 1991). However, the diﬀerence in welfare between m∗ = n and m∗ = n− 1
is smaller the larger is the number of retailers. This relationship will be analyzed
more below, where we also discuss how the welfare eﬀects of RPM - and of a policy
which restricts its use - depend on how close horizontal substitutes the retailers are.
3 Restrictions on Industry-Wide Adoption
The guidelines mentioned in the introduction consider safe harbors when evaluating
the likely welfare eﬀects of a given vertical practice. These safe harbors are meant
to provide policy makers with a short-cut to better decision making. One such safe
harbor concerns the pervasiveness of the practice in the relevant market, and it
is typically specified in percentage terms, e.g., the use of RPM by a firm will be
scrutinized if more than 50% of the market is already covered. Unfortunately, when
retailers diﬀer in size, a cap on the percentage share of sales in a given market that
can be covered by RPM does not easily translate into a prescription of how many
firms can adopt the practice before it receives scrutiny. To simplify, we therefore
specialize now to the case in which all n retailers are ex-ante symmetric.
When retailers are ex-ante symmetric, the number of firms that can safely adopt
RPM without scrutiny is approximately n times the market-share threshold used in
the guidelines.9 Let k denote the largest integer which is less than or equal to this
number. Two polar cases are worth noting. Under a policy of laissez faire, all firms
9It is approximate because the prices of the leaders will in general be higher than the prices of
the followers, thus causing each leader’s share to be somewhat smaller than each follower’s share.
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are allowed to adopt RPM, and the market-share threshold is eﬀectively 100%. In
this case, k = n. On the other hand, if all instances of RPM are subject to scrutiny,
then k = 0, and the threshold is 0%. This corresponds to a per-se prohibition if it
eﬀectively implies that no firm can adopt RPM. For all other cases, k ∈ {1, ..., n−1}.
We make the following additional assumption. Given that RPM has no eﬃciency
justification in our model, we assume that if it is subjected to scrutiny (so that all
the pros and cons are considered), a firm’s adoption of RPM will be challenged.
Hence, it follows that k is the upper bound on the number of firms in the market
that may adopt RPM. Using Proposition 1, we then have the following result:
Proposition 3: Under a safe harbor threshold of k, the number of leaders in
any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is m∗ = k for all k ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}. For the
unconstrained case, k = n, the set of equilibria is the same as in Proposition 1.
To see this, note that by assumption the number of leaders in equilibrium cannot
exceed k, and the number of leaders cannot be less than k, when k < n− 1, as per
the proof of Proposition 1. Hence, k eﬀectively provides both an upper and lower
bound on the equilibrium number of firms that may adopt RPM when k < n− 1.
Two results immediately follow from Propositions 2 and 3:
Corollary 1:
(1) Welfare is maximized when k = 0 (or, equivalently, when RPM is per se illegal).
(2) There exists an equilibrium under laissez faire (k = n) that yields strictly higher
welfare than in any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with 0 < k < n leaders.
The results in (1) and (2) are seemingly contradictory. The fact that welfare
is maximized when k = 0, or, equivalently, when RPM is prohibited per se, is not
surprising because our model does not allow for eﬃciencies. But, given that RPM
is used to dampen competition, it would seem that a policy of limiting the scope of
coverage, while not first best, would still be better than doing nothing. As Corollary
1 implies, however, this need not be true. Welfare under a laissez faire policy may
be strictly higher than welfare under even the most judiciously chosen safe harbor.
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The intuition is that even though RPM is anticompetitive in the sense that
each firm is seeking to dampen competition, competitive forces alone may suﬃce
to minimize the overall impact, and in the case of m∗ = n, render it harmless. By
imposing safe harbors in these circumstances, authorities may risk interfering with
these forces.
Of course, depending on howWm=k compares toWm=n−1, it is also possible that
the imposition of safe harbors may improve welfare. To consider this possibility, it is
necessary to impose additional structure by specifying a functional form of demand.
We use the following Shubik-Levitan (1980) utility function:
U(q1.., qi, .., qn) = v
nX
i=1
qi −
n
2
⎡
⎣(1− b)
nX
i=1
q2i +
b
n
Ã
nX
i=1
qi
!2⎤
⎦ . (4)
The parameter v > 0 in this utility function is a measure of the market potential,
qi ≥ 0 is the quantity from retailer i, and n ≥ 2 is the number of retailers. The
parameter b ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of how diﬀerentiated the retailers are; they are
completely independent and have monopoly power if b = 0, while the consumers
perceive them to be identical if b = 1. More generally, the retailers are closer sub-
stitutes from the consumers’ point of view the higher is b. The merit of using this
particular utility function is that the size of the market does not vary with b or n.10
Solving ∂U/∂qi − pi = 0 for i = 1, ...., n, we find
qi =
1
n
µ
v − pi
1− b +
b
1− bp¯
¶
, (5)
where p¯ = 1n
nP
j=1
pj. The demand function facing retailer i is thus a linear combination
of his own price pi and the average price, p¯. Total demand equalsQ =
Pn
i=1 qi = v−p¯.
As before we assume that m retailers are leaders, while n − m retailers are
followers. For the sake of simplicity, we let c = 0. In stage 2 any followers set pfi .
10Others using the Shubik-Levitan framework include Motta (2004), who applies the Shubik-
Levitan utility function in several models in order to analyze vertical restraints and other compe-
tition policy issues; Shaﬀer (1991), who uses a similar framework in his welfare analysis of slotting
allowances and RPM under a retail duopoly; and Deneckere and Davidson (1985), who use the
Shubik-Levitan demand system when they analyze the merger incentives of price-setting firms.
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Solving ∂πfi /∂p
f
i = 0 and then imposing symmetry, we find:
bpf = v (1− b)n
n(2− b) + b(m− 1) +
b
n(2− b) + b(m− 1)
mX
j=1
plj. (6)
Since the manufacturers’ participation constraints are binding, they will eﬀec-
tively maximize the leaders’ profits when they choose the RPM prices at stage 1.
Solving the first-order conditions for the leaders (∂πli/∂pli = 0), subject to the fol-
lowers’ reaction functions from equation (6), and then imposing symmetry, we find:
pl =
vn (2n− b) (1− b)
b2 (1 +m) + 2 [n2 (2− b)− 2bn] . (7)
An explicit expression for the price charged by the followers can be found by
inserting (7) into (6). It is then easily verified that we get the standard result that
the leaders charge higher prices than the followers (pl > pf) for all b ∈ (0, 1). It can
further be verified that there is a humped-shaped relationship between the average
consumer price p¯ and m. The intuition for this is clear; for low values of m we have
dp¯/dm > 0, since we then move away from the pure Bertrand equilibrium. However,
as m→ n we again approach the pure Bertrand equilibrium, so that dp¯/dm < 0.
Above we defined welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and profits, where
CS = U −
Pn
i piqi and
P
πi =
Pn
i=1 (pi − c) qi. Since we have set marginal costs
equal to zero, welfare is simply equal to consumer surplus net of payment; W = U.
It is now convenient to express welfare in terms of b and the prices to consumers:
W = φ1 +
1− b
2
φ2, (8)
where
φ1 =
1
2
¡
v2 − p¯2
¢
,
and
φ2 = (v − p¯)
2 −
"
m
n
µ
(v − p¯)− p
l − p¯
1− b
¶2
+
n−m
n
µ
(v − p¯)− p
f − p¯
1− b
¶2#
.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (8) measures how welfare de-
pends on the average price, p¯, while the second termmeasures how welfare is aﬀected
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by the price variations among the retailers. Other things equal, consumers prefer
a lower average price (higher φ1) and they prefer that all retailers charge the same
price (higher φ2). It is straightforward to show that φ2 is maximized at φ2 = 0 when
pl = pf . Otherwise, φ2 < 0. In the Appendix, we further prove the following:
Proposition 4: Welfare is U-shaped in the number of leaders. Moreover, for
all b ∈ (0, 1), there exists mˆ(b) ≤ n/2 such that welfare is minimized at m = mˆ(b).
The intuition for this is as follows. The average price to consumers is first
increasing and then decreasing in m, as was established earlier. This eﬀect alone
implies that welfare is first decreasing and then increasing in the number of leaders.
In addition, the gap between pl and pf is decreasing in m, as would be expected
given that the leaders are becoming less concentrated and the followers are becoming
more concentrated. This eﬀect alone implies that welfare is always increasing in m.
Thus, for large enoughm, both eﬀects go in the same direction and welfare is strictly
increasing. The proposition follows on noting that the average price to consumers
is already decreasing at m = n/2. This result has implications for public policy:
Corollary 2: A public policy that reduces the number of firms with RPM below
the laissez-faire equilibrium reduces welfare if the safe harbor threshold is at or above
n/2. In this interval, Wm=k < Wm=k0 < Wm=n−1 < Wm=n for feasible k, k0, k0 > k.
We know from Proposition 3 that under a safe-harbor threshold of k ≤ n−1, the
number of leaders in any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is m∗ = k. Moreover,
we know from Proposition 4 that welfare is increasing in m for all m ≥ n/2. Hence,
it follows that for all k ∈ [n/2, n − 1], welfare is increasing in k. Consequently, a
government policy that has a safe-harbor threshold close to k = n−1 does well, and
as we shall see, for large n, it does almost as well as a policy with k = 0 or k = n.
How would conventional guidelines fare? In the case of the 1985 U.S. vertical-
restraints guidelines, the safe-harbor threshold for industry-wide adoption is 60%.
In the case of the EC’s vertical restraints guidelines, the safe-harbor threshold for
industry-wide adoption is 50% (see the discussion in the introduction). Thus, by
Corollary 2, the U.S. guidelines would fare somewhat better at inducing higher
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welfare in this industry (by allowing for a wider RPM coverage in the relevant
market). However, in both cases the safe-harbor thresholds, and the restrictions
they imply for industry-wide adoption, would fall well short of maximizing welfare.
In Figure 1 below we provide a numerical example of a safe-harbor restriction
that prevents more than 50% of the firms from using RPM; i.e. m ≤ n/2. From
the analysis above we know that the restriction will be binding, such that m = n/2.
Let us defineWL ≡
¡
Wm=n −Wm=n/2
¢
as the welfare loss (WL) from imposing this
restriction relative to the pure Bertrand pricing game (m = n or m = 0). Figure
1 shows that the welfare loss reaches a maximum when b is approximately 0.7.11
Figure 1 also makes it clear that the welfare loss from imposing a restriction on
industry-wide adoption of RPM is higher the lower the number of retailers.
Figure 1: Welfare loss (WL) when m = n/2.
4 Restrictions on Dominant-Firm Adoption
Proposition 1 stated that under a laissez-faire policy there exist n equilibria where
the number of leaders equals m∗ = (n− 1) and one where m∗ = n. As discussed
above, profits will be lower in the latter equilibrium, since we then have pure
11In Figure 1 we have assumed that c = 0 and v = 10.
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Bertrand competition. We may therefore expect the firms to coordinate on the
equilibria where m∗ = (n− 1) . This is true whether the retailers are intrinsically
symmetric or not. Still, it is not immaterial which firm is the follower if the retailers
diﬀer in their market potential. From a welfare point of view it may be particularly
worrisome if the firm with the greatest market potential (the "dominant firm") is a
leader. The reason is that a firm’s incentives to set a high price tends to be larger
the greater its output (qk); in our case the marginal profit of a small price increase
is simply dπk/dpk = qk + pkdqk/dpk. As a leader, the dominant firm’s relatively
high price induces the follower to charge a relatively high price too. This suggests
that the average price may be higher if the dominant firm is a leader than if it is a
follower. To see this formally, let us modify the utility function in (4) to
U(q1.., qi, .., qn) =
nX
i=1
viqi −
n
2
⎡
⎣(1− b)
nX
i=1
q2i +
b
n
Ã
nX
i=1
qi
!2⎤
⎦ .
The larger is vi, the greater is the market potential of retailer i.We order the retailers
such that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn. Solving ∂U/∂qi − pi = 0 for i = 1, ..., n we have
qi =
1
n (1− b) [vi − pi + b (p¯− v¯)] , (9)
where p¯ = 1n
nP
j=1
pj (as above) and v¯ = 1n
nP
j=1
vj.
Suppose first that the firm with the largest market potential, retailer 1, is the
follower. Then retailer 1’s first-order condition is ∂π1/∂p1 = q1 + p1∂q1/∂p1 = 0.
Inserting for q1 from equation (9) this yields retailer 1’s profit-maximizing price
p1 =
v1 + b (p¯− v¯)
2n− b . (10)
In contrast, the first-order condition for retailer j, j 6= 1, is
dπj
dpj
= qj + pj
dqj
dpj
= 0, (11)
where
dqj
dpj
=
µ
∂qj
∂pj
+
∂qj
∂p1
dp1
dpj
¶
. (12)
The first term in the bracket on the right-hand side of (12) measures the direct quan-
tity eﬀect for retailer j of increasing her price, which from (9) is ∂qj∂pj = −
n−b
n2(1−b) < 0.
14
However, there is also an indirect eﬀect; a price increase from retailer j induces the
follower to charge a higher price, thus reducing (but not eliminating) the negative
quantity eﬀect for retailer j. Using (9) and (10) we find that ∂qj∂p1 =
b
n2(1−b) and
dp1
dpj
= b
2(n−b) , respectively. Simplifying, we can thus rewrite the derivative in (12) as
dqj
dpj
= − 2 (n− b)
2 − b2
2n2 (1− b) (n− b)pj. (13)
Combining (9), (11) and (13) we can now express the first-order condition for
retailer j as
vj −
2n (2n− 3b) + b2
2n (n− b) pj + b (p¯− v¯) = 0. (14)
Summing (14) over all leaders, j = 2, ..., n, using that
Pn
j=2 vj = nv¯ − v1 andPn
j=2 pj = np¯−p1, and inserting for p1 from (10) we can write the average price p¯1F
(with superscript 1F to indicate that retailer 1 is the follower) as
p¯1F =
[2n (1− b) (n− b) (2n− b) + b3] v¯ − b2v1
2 (n− b) [2n (2− b)− b (4− b)]n . (15)
If instead retailer d, where d 6= 1 is the follower, then the average price is
p¯dF =
[2n (1− b) (n− b) (2n− b) + b3] v¯ − b2vd
2 (n− b) [2n (2− b)− b (4− b)]n . (16)
Subtracting (16) from (15) we find that
p¯1F − p¯dF = − b
2
2 (n− b) [2n (2− b)− b (4− b)]n (v1 − vd) ,
which is strictly negative if v1 > vd. It follows that the average price is lowest if the
firm with the greatest market potential is the follower. More generally, we can show
that the average price in the market is lower if retailer i is the follower than if retailer
d is the follower if and only if vi > vd. By the same token, it is straightforward to
show that the price variation among retailers is increasing in the average price. Thus
the price variation is lower if retailer i is the follower than if retailer d is the follower
if and only if vi > vd. In the present case — where m∗ = n− 1 — welfare is therefore
higher when the lone follower has a greater market potential.
Above we have defined welfare in the equilibrium with all firms as leaders, m∗ =
n, as Wm∗=n. We now define WiF , where i = 1, ..., n, as welfare in the equilibrium
where m∗ = n− 1 and retailer i is the follower. Then we have the following result:
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Proposition 5: Suppose retailers diﬀer in their market potential, and order
them such that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn. Then, we have Wm∗=n > W1F ≥ W2F ≥ ... ≥
WnF , where WiF > WjF if and only if vi > vj.
This result has implications for public policy:
Corollary 3: A public policy that prohibits the dominant firm from using RPM
ensures a higher welfare than in any of the other equilibria with m = n− 1 leaders.
It is well known that all firms make a higher profit in a Stackelberg game than
in a pure Bertrand game, but that followers are better oﬀ than leaders in price
games with intrinsically symmetric firms. However, this does not necessarily hold
when retailers diﬀer in their market potential. On the contrary, it can be shown
that the dominant firm makes higher profits as a leader than as a follower if its
market potential is suﬃciently larger than those of the other firms. The explanation
is precisely that she is best able to ensure high market prices by becoming a leader.
One might therefore expect a dominant firm to emerge as the leader in a free market
equilibrium. The policy implication is that this may lead to the worst outcome
among all equilibria with m∗ = n − 1 leaders, and thus it may be wise to prohibit
this from happening even if there are no restrictions on industry-wide adoption (for
instance due to eﬃciency reasons). However, it should be born in mind that such a
prohibition also prevents the equilibrium with m∗ = n leaders from being reached.
5 Concluding Remarks
There has been a call from economists, legal scholars, and policy makers in recent
years to apply a rule of reason approach toward resale price maintenance (RPM),
similar to what is applied for other types of vertical practices. Assuming the Supreme
Court agrees, this naturally raises the question of how a rule-of-reason approach
should be structured. One possibility is for policy makers to rely on already drafted
vertical restraints guidelines in the U.S. and the EU, which establish market-share
thresholds (or safe harbors) to indicate when adoption of RPM by a firm might raise
concerns.
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For the most part, the underlying assumption in these guidelines is that the
vertical practice at hand may be used to facilitate tacit collusion. Hence, by limiting
the pervasiveness of the practice, and taking it out of the hands of the largest firms,
the presumption is that welfare can be improved upon and certainly not worsened.
However, as is well known, tacit collusion is only one possible motivation behind
the use of RPM, and in the present paper we analyze its unilateral use to dampen
competition. Our main result is that a public policy which prohibits dominant firms
from adopting RPM can improve welfare, but a policy that reduces the number
of retailers with RPM below the outcome in an unregulated market economy may
lower welfare, unless RPM is completely prohibited. To maximize welfare, therefore,
either all firms must adopt RPM or no firm can be allowed to use the restraint.
The case at hand is in particular relevant due to the Supreme Court’s recent
decision (Leegin) to reconsider the per se ban on RPM from Dr. Miles (1911).
Leegin makes leather products, and in 1997 the firm started to sell their products
only to retailers who used Leegin’s suggested retail prices. When it was discovered
that a retailer sold at a lower price, Leegin stopped the shipments. Thereby Leegin
allegedly violated the per se ban on RPM. However, on December 6, 2006, the
Supreme Court agreed to reconsider the per se ban on RPM in the Leegin case.
Leegin’s advocates emphasize that the case is a perfect vehicle to revisit the general
ban on RPM, since Leegin is a manufacturer with no market power and operates
in an environment of intensive competition. As a consequence, Leegin’s advocates
argue that there is no reason to fear that RPM can have anti-competitive eﬀects in
this case (Los Angeles Times, 2006). The model in the present paper in fact assumes
a perfectly competitive manufacturing industry, but we allow for diﬀerent levels of
competition at the retail level. We show that restrictions on industry-wide adoptions
of RPM may have negative welfare eﬀects, unless RPM is completely prohibited.
Our model is highly stylized and does not consider the possibility of eﬃciencies.
Nevertheless, it suggests that indiscriminate use of market-share thresholds as a
guide in evaluating vertical cases is unwise. Future research could examine other
motivations for RPM and assess the desirability of restrictions on dominant firm and
industry-wide adoption. We view our paper as a first step in this research program.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, we will show that equilibria with m∗ = n and m∗ = n − 1 leaders exist.
Then, we will show that no other equilibria exist.
Consider the case with m∗ = n leaders. In order for this to be an equilibrium, no
firm can increase its profits by becoming a follower. Since this case has no followers
the game becomes a simple Bertrand pricing game. If a firm becomes a follower,
its best response will be to charge its Bertrand price and receive the same profits.
Therefore, m∗ = n leaders is an equilibrium.¥
Now consider the case with n− 1 leaders. Again, in order to be an equilibrium,
no firm can benefit from changing its strategy. Consider firm m, a leader. She will
not want to become a follower. Her first-order conditions as a leader are:
(pm − c)Dmm(p) +Dm(p) +Dmn (pm − c) = 0 (17)
If a leader became a follower, she would be adding a restriction to her profit maxi-
mization problem. As a leader, she could have chosen the price forced by a followers
reaction function. Looking at her decision another way, by becoming a follower she
would no longer be able to exploit the follower’s reaction function.
The first-order conditions as a follower are:
(pm − c)Dmm(p) +Dm(p) = 0 (18)
Assume that pfm and plm are retailer m’s price as a follower and leader, respec-
tively. By evaluating the leader’s FOC (17) at pfm it follows from the follower’s FOC
(18) that the first two terms are zero. The last term in (17) is positive, and it
therefore profitable to raise the price to plm. Retailer m will remain as a leader.
The follower’s (retailer n) first-order conditions as a follower are:
(pn − c)Dnn(p) +Dn(p) = 0 (19)
Both prices and profits are independent of the choice of strategy, and retailer
n will therefore have no incentive to switch strategy. In other words, the follower
18
is already charging its best response to the leaders’ prices, and the price it would
choose if it became a leader would be this same best response price. Since both
situations would yield the same outcome, the follower is indiﬀerent between staying
a follower and becoming a leader. Therefore m∗ = n− 1 leaders is an equilibrium.¥
Finally, we show by contradiction that there exists no equilibriumwithm < n−1.
Assume that there exists an equilibrium where m < n − 1. The retailer m + 1’s
first-order conditions as follower and leader are, respectively:
(pm+1 − c)Dm+1m+1(p) +Dm+1(p) = 0 (20)
(pm+1 − c)Dm+1m+1(p) +Dm+1(p) +
nX
i=m+2
(pm+1 − c)Dm+1i (p) = 0 (21)
Assume that pfm+1 and plm+1 are retailer m + 1’s price as a follower and leader,
respectively. Analogously to above we have that πfm+1(p
f
m+1) = πlm+1(p
f
m+1). By
evaluating (21) at pfm+1, the two first terms are zero, while the third term is positive.
Retailer m+ 1 will thus increase its profit by increasing price to plm+1, and retailer
m + 1 will consequently want to switch from being a follower to being a leader,
i.e. πlm+1(plm+1) > π
f
m+1(p
f
m+1) = πlm+1(p
f
m+1). Thus, m < n − 1 cannot be an
equilibrium. If there is more than one follower, one of them would benefit from
becoming a leader. The firm can only be better oﬀ, since it can always choose
the same price it was charging as a follower. Since the other leaders’ prices are
fixed, becoming a leader would allow the firm to exploit the other followers’ reaction
functions, and raise their prices. Thus, there do not exist equilibria with m < n− 1
leaders. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
For convenience we repeat the welfare function
W =
1
2
¡
v2 − p2
¢
+
1− b
2
φ2,
where the first and second term measures how welfare depends on the average price
and price variations, respectively. Diﬀerentiating the two terms with respect to m it
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turns out that we get f(b) = b2(1− b) as a common factor, and it is useful to define
W1 ≡ 12 (v2 − p
2) /f(b) and W2 = 1−b2 φ2/f(b) in order to find the relative strength
of the two terms in the welfare function when m increases. We then have
dW
dm
= f(b)
µ
dW1
dm
+
dW2
dm
¶
.
We now find that dW1dm
¯¯
b=0 =
v2
8n3
¡
m− n
2
¢
and dW2dm
¯¯
b=0 = 0. In the neighborhood
of b = 0 we thus have signdWdm = sign
dW1
dm
¯¯
b=0 = sign
¡
m− n
2
¢
. In this area, welfare
will in other words increase with the number of RPM retailers if m ≥ n/2.
We further have dW1dm
¯¯
b=1 = 0 and
dW2
dm
¯¯
b=1 =
(n−m)2v2N
2(1+m+2n2−4n)3(n+m−1)3 , where N =
(−5n2 − 27mn2 + n+ 20mn− 3nm2 − 4m− 2n4 + 10mn3 + 6n3 + 4m2n2) . In the
neighborhood of b = 1 we thus have signdWdm = sign
dW2
dm
¯¯
b=1 = signN. This implies
that dWdm > 0 around b = 1 if
m >
√
1281n4 − 1236n3 + 628n2 − 660n5 − 160n+ 16 + 132n6 + 27n2 − 20n+ 4− 10n3
2n (4n− 3) .
The reason why dW2dm dominates over
dW1
dm for high values of b and vice versa, is
that when b is high, the followers have strong incentives to undercut the leader in
order to steal business. Therefore pl will be relatively high compared to pf . For
low values of b, on the other hand, the retailers are such poor substitutes that the
undercutting incentives of the followers are small. The diﬀerence in the price charges
by the leaders and the followers are thus strictly increasing in b :
∂
¡
pl/pf
¢
∂b
=
2 (n−m) ((4− b)n− b+ b (m− 1))nb
(b2 + 2 (n2 (2− b)− 2bn) + 2bmn)2
> 0.
Moreover, as explained in the main text, the term dW1dm is relatively small for high
values of b, since both the market power of the firms and the industry’s ability to
charge a high average price are low when the retailers are close substitutes.
We now show that m ≥ n/2 is a suﬃcient condition for dW/dm > 0. The proof
consists of two parts. We first show that the price variation is decreasing in the
number of leaders. To this end we note that
d
¡
pl − pf
¢
dm
=
vnb2 (1− b)Ψ1
D2
,
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where D ≡ (b2 (1 +m) + 2 (n2 (2− b)− 2bn)) (n(2− b) + b(m− 1)) and Ψ1 ≡£
b
¡
12− 4b+ b2
¢
− 4 (2− b)n
¤
n2 −
£
(2m− 1) b3 + 6b2
¤
n+
¡
1 +m2
¢
b3.
We thus have sign
d(pl−pf)
dm = signΨ1. Since
dΨ1
dm
= −2b3 (n−m) (22)
it follows that if Ψ1 < 0 for m = 0, thenΨ1 < 0 for all possible values of m < n. We
also have
dΨ1
dn
= −
£
12 (2− b)n−
¡
2b3 + 24b− 8b2
¢¤
n− 2b3m+ b3 − 6b2 (23)
A suﬃcient condition to ensure that dΨ1dn < 0 is that the terms in the square bracket
of (23) is negative, which is always true if n ≥ 3/2. It is further straightforward
to show that Ψ (m = 0, n = 3/2) < 0. From (22) and (23) it thus follows that Ψ is
negative in the relevant area (n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 0). This proves that the variation in
prices is decreasing in m.
The second part of the proof consists of showing that the average price is de-
creasing in m for m ≥ n/2. To this end we note that
∂p¯
∂m
= −v (1− b) b
2 (2n− b)Ψ2
D2
,
where Ψ2 ≡ 2 (m− n/2) b2 + 2mn [b (m− 2n) + 4 (n− b)] − 2n3 (2− b) + 4n2b. We
immediately see that Ψ2 is increasing inm, and at m = n/2 we have Ψ2 = 12n
3b > 0.
This proves that a suﬃcient condition for ∂p¯∂m < 0 is that m ≥ n/2. ¥
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